Jerry Crasnick recently penned a column discussing how Toronto Blue Jays center fielder Vernon Wells has failed to live up to his massive contract so far. Crasnick did a fine job of describing the issue and touching on Wells’ offensive struggles, even going to the player to see how he felt about the matter.

It was an enjoyable read overall and pointed out the albatross deal and performance drop-off that hasn’t attracted a whole lot of scrutiny on a national level. Plus, it was good to see that Wells is legitimately down about how it has all played out so far, though he isn’t the type of player to display his frustrations to his teammates. When diving deeper into the topic, though, I quickly realized that the article only touches the surface of the predicament that the Toronto organization finds itself.

The Blue Jays, afraid of losing what they believed to be a franchise cornerstone to free agency the following offseason, locked up Wells to a seven-year, $126-M extension on December 18, 2006; the dollars included represented the sixth-highest total in the history of the sport at the time. (It’s worth pointing out the context in which he was given so much money: that winter, teams were spending money like it was going out of style, with three other players–Carlos Lee, Alfonso Soriano and Barry Zito–all topping the $100-M mark.)

Many within the local and national media (in the article linked, Buster Olney argued that Wells would command near $200-M in free agency) applauded the Toronto front office for spending the money to keep the slugger in uniform. While many felt that it was a good-faith deal, however, there were definite concerns about the move at the time that it was made. The then 27-year-old outfielder was coming off an excellent campaign–he was worth 5.8 Wins Above Replacement (WAR) after hitting .303/.357/.542 with a 129 OPS+ and 7.5 UZR in center field–but tying up so much back loaded money into a single player appeared to be a major risk for a team with such limited financial resources.

The thought process behind the decision were questionable, and, while it’s still too early to draw any major conclusions and injuries have played a factor in Wells’ struggles, the corresponding outcome has been even worse.

Year one of the contract didn’t go according to plan for Wells, who was bothered by a shoulder injury and hit just .245/.304/.402 with a career-low 85 OPS+ and .306 Weighted On-Base Average (wOBA) in 642 plate appearances. His home run total was cut in half, from 32 in ‘06 to 16, while his Isolated Power fell to a career-worst .158. While his .265 batting average on balls in play was nearly 30 points below his career average, he hit fewer line drives (16.8 LD%) and more weak fly balls than any other point in his career; since it’s easier for a defense to convert fly balls into outs and his FB% came to a career-high 41.5%, a run of bad luck clearly wasn’t the only factor suppressing the total. A lot of the offensive struggles were attributed to the shoulder, which was indeed a valid concern that prevented him from driving the ball with as much authority as he had in the past.

Perhaps most concerning, Wells also failed to live up to his reputation as being an elite defender. He produced a UZR figure in the red (-1.1) for the first time since 2003 while ranking last among American League outfielders in range factor. When accounting for batting, fielding and positional factors, he was worth only 0.8 WAR; his on-field production translated to $3.2-M worth of performance, according to FanGraphs. Since the deal was so heavily back ended, his salary wasn’t a major strain on the Blue Jays’ payroll–he was set to due $5.6-M in the final year of his previous contract.

Headed into 2008, Wells was anxious to get back on the field and prove that he was worth the commitment that Toronto made in him. Injuries continued to limit him, however, as he missed 26 games early in the spring after breaking his left wrist. His hamstring then acted up later in the summer, forcing him to make another long stint on the disabled list. While he produced at the plate when healthy (.300/.343/.496, 121 OPS+, .357 wOBA) he played in only 108 games overall and graded out as one of majors’ least effective defenders at his position with a -14.3 UZR and -24.0 UZR/150. Advanced fielding data has its flaws, of course, but most new metrics reached the same conclusion about his defense. Primarily because of the fielding runs that he allowed, he only produced 1.2 WAR ($5.5-M). The defensive regression was quite a surprise (with some calling it a statistical fluke), but many scouts also made note of his suddenly declining range.

Through 72 games so far in 2009, matters have only gotten worse for the team and player on both accounts. Wells has really struggled at the plate, hitting .248/.303/.384 with a below-average 81 OPS+ and .310 wOBA. His BABIP is again way down at .267, but, as anyone who has watched a lot of Blue Jays games on MLB.tv or in person can attest, the baseball gods coming down on Wells aren’t the only problem. He has only left the yard six times, with his IsoP sitting at .136; for those scoring at home, shortstop Marco Scutaro’s mark is three points higher. While he will surely improve, ZiPS has his updated projected line at .257/.312/.405 with 15 home runs and a .319 wOBA.

Those hoping for a rebound with the glove have been disappointed so far, too. Wells ranks dead last among major league center fielders with a -16.1 UZR and -33.4 UZR/150. The sample size is still relatively small, but the likelihood that noise in the data is selling his defense short continues to shrink, a concerning development for Toronto.

In order to have any chance of earning his paycheck over the long haul, Wells will need to serve as an asset in center. Like any other player, his bat won’t play as well on a corner–especially if he can’t turn it around–but that seems where he’s headed in the near future. If the defensive reports are an accurate indicator of his talent level, it’s unlikely that he’ll be able to stay at a premium position over the duration. He’s still banged up a bit, but there’s just no sugarcoating his sub-replacement-level output (-1.0 WAR) output.

Thus, while the deal looks regrettable now, it could end up getting much worse when the team starts having to shell out the real money down the road.

Here’s how the deal how the dollars will play out until 2014, courtesy of Cot’s Baseball Contracts:

7 years/$126M (2008-14)
–signed extension with Toronto 12/06
–$25.5M signing bonus (paid in 3 $8.5M installments, March 1 2008-10)
–08:$0.5M, 09:$1.5M, 10:$12.5M, 11:$23M, 12:$21M, 13:$21M, 14:$21M
–full no-trade clause
–Wells may opt out of contract after 2011
–award bonuses: $0.25M for MVP, $0.2M for World Series MVP, $0.15M for LCS MVP, $0.1M for receiving most All-Star votes in league
–Wells to donate $143,000 annually to Blue Jays charity

I’m going to take the under on 50-50 chances that Wells will be worth 23-M n 2011, let alone $52-M over the three years after that.

The Blue Jays took a gamble, but, even if he starts hitting, it doubtful that it’ll end up working out. Wells is a good player and still has value, of course. For a team with a limited budget to work with, though, he could really bring them down–the opportunity cost of not being able to sign Roy Halladay or attract other players as a result could be huge. Plus, he has a full no-trade clause and will be difficult to unload. In an American League East environment that’s only going to improve with the Baltimore Orioles making progress down on the farm, these factors could prove to be crippling.

Note: Needless to say, it’s unlikely we’ll ever again see an offseason like ‘06, as not one of the $100-M men appears to have been a wise investment. It only takes one foolish GM to drive up the market value for a player, but with teams building cost-efficient assets from within, these kinds of deals should continue to become more and more obsolete.