The San Francisco Giants on Friday re-signed veteran second baseman Freddy Sanchez to a two-year, $12-M contract. The Giants had an $8.1-M player option on Sanchez for 2010, but the front office instead chose to offer an extra year and a lower annual rate.
After thinking about this for a while, I have mixed feelings about this deal for San Francisco. Last week, I previewed the relatively weak free agent class of second basemen for 2010. Although I initially overlooked the knee injury reg flag, here is what I wrote about Sanchez:
“I hated the Sanchez trade at first, but then softened my stance when it came out that Tim Alderson had really seen his prospect status dim. That said, from a pure results standpoint, things did not really work out for Brian Sabean and the San Francisco Giants. The Giants missed the postseason, of course, because of a joke offense. Sanchez, acquired to help out on that front, did little to cure the offensive woes, batting .284/.295/.324 with a horrendous 62 OPS+ in 107 plate appearances after the trade.
…He is a fine defensive infielder who produced an excellent 6.7 UZR and 7.4 UZR/150 at the position in ’09. Even with his clear deficiencies on offense (no power, poor walk rate), he is likely to be worth close to those dollars because of his fielding. Indeed, despite grading out 2.3 runs below average with the bat overall in ’09, he still put up 2.2 WAR. He is definitely overrated on offense because of his batting crown, but he can pick it and earn live up to his option assuming that he can stay healthy.”
I assumed that Brian Sabean would pick up Sanchez’s option for ’10 if they could not work out a deal like this. Although Alderson is no longer an elite prospect, he was still a significant cost for a two-and-half month rental—especially one with injury baggage. The results obviously did not work out for the Giants, and the processes that went into the trade were not great, either; the Pittsburgh Pirates were looking to shed salary with an injured player, yet somehow were able to land a pretty solid prospect in return. Thus, I did not expect Sabean to simply cut his losses and part with Sanchez altogether, admitting that the trade was a pretty large mistake. Sometimes a team needs to just bite the bullet and consider a player a sunk cost, but it takes a certain mold of general manager to do that.
Bringing Sanchez back essentially takes away public relations hit in that regard. I would have preferred to see the annual dollars a bit lower, and there is still a ton of risk given the status of Sanchez’s knee injury. However, the dollars here are not that out of whack. Sanchez hits a hollow .300, offering little power and terrible on-base skills. Depending on how his batting average on balls in play fluctuates, though, he still profiles as an above-average offensive performer for the position. Plus, his defense is extremely valuable and was the reason why he was still worth 2.2 WAR/$10.1-M (granted, free agent prices have dropped considerably because of the economy/teams getting smarter). Second basemen do not usually age well, of course, and his defense could slip because of the knee injury. Thus, a safe projection pegs him at around a 1.5-to-3.0-win player going forward (with a ceiling of about 4.0 WAR) in ’10, and perhaps a cut beneath that the year after. If he puts up 4.0 WAR total over the length of the contract, he will live up to his paycheck
In addition, signing Sanchez means that the team will not be forced to part with any draft pick compensation. Had the team decided to decline his option and go after one of the other options mentioned—and the class is weak, making this more reasonable—in my article on the open market, they could have run into that issue. That is another bonus to the deal that is getting lost in all of the talk about how Sanchez is a former batting champ, “veteran presence” and “true ballplayer.”
Run prevention was definitely not the issue for the ’09 Giants. The club excelled in that facet of the game but could not produce any runs. For this reason, I am not thrilled about this move, because the majority of Sanchez’s value comes from his potentially declining defense and he does little to help the team’s on-base and slugging percentage issues. He is better than any internal option, though, and, seeing what Sabean has done in the past, the deal, in both length and dollars, could have turned out to be a whole lot worse.
San Francisco needs to spend the rest of the winter upgrading its middling offensive attack. Manager Bruce Bochy told reporters that he plans on using Sanchez in the two, and on some days three, spot in the lineup. Contemplating using him as a three hitter is nuts. Sanchez needs to be a complementary player, not a middle-of-the-order type, so if he indeed sees time in the three hole, that will say more about the Giants’ inability to properly address a glaring weakness this winter than his offensive abilities.
Garko a non-tender candidate: The other “big” acquisition picked up to cure the Giants’ offensive woes was Ryan Garko of the Cleveland Indians. Sabean sent prospect Scott Barnes to Cleveland in exchange for the right-handed hitting Garko, who is now a non-tender candidate. He hit just .235/.307/.330 with a 68 OPS+ in 127 plate appearances after the trade, losing time down the stretch. He can still kill lefties, but he is a limited player overall when factoring in defense and has managed only 1.3 WAR the past two seasons combined. For the price of Barnes, a legitimate prospect at this point, he was not worth the trouble. I hated the processes that went into the trade, as I wrote here. The results turned out to be even worse, however, and are simply poetic justice for a bad decision.
